A fundamental concern of any secure group communication system is key management and wireless environments create new challenges. One core requirement in these emerging networks is self-healing. In systems where users can be offline and miss updates, selfhealing allows a user to recover lost session keys and get back into the secure communication without putting extra burden on the group manager. Clearly, self-healing must only be available to authorised users. This paper fixes the problem of collusion attack in an existing self-healing key distribution scheme and provides a highly efficient scheme as compared to the existing works. It is computationally secure, resists collusion attacks made between newly joined users and revoked users and achieves forward and backward secrecy. Our security analysis is in an appropriate security model. Unlike the existing constructions, our scheme does not forbid revoked users from rejoining in later sessions.
Introduction
Mobile wireless ad hoc networks have wide applications in military operations, rescue missions and scientific explorations, where there are usually no network infrastructure support and the adversary may intercept, modify, and/or partially interrupt the communication. In such applications, security becomes a critical concern. Key distribution and subsequent key updating are cornerstones for secure communication in such networks. The life of such communication network is usually partitioned into short time-periods called sessions. A group manager generates and distributes a session key to the users in the communication group at initialisation stage. All data broadcast within the group should be encrypted with the session key so that only authorised users with session key can access the messages. The session key must be updated with sessions upon each membership change for secure communication.
The traditional approaches for key distribution and group re-keying used for reliable network are not suitable for large and dynamic wireless networks. Key distribution over reliable channels requires strong infrastructure such as wired network and a lot of bandwidth for delivering data punctually to destination. Key distribution over unreliable channels confronts more constraints and challenges. Key distribution messages can be delayed when they are delivered and some messages might never reach to some authorised users. Request or retransmission between individual users and the group manager in a large group will induce much communication overhead and make the group manager heavily burdened. These are infeasible in many multi-media distribution systems that are based on a uni-directional broadcast distribution channel (Safavi-Naini and Wang, 2000; Naor et al., 2001; Perrig et al., 2001; Gada et al., 2004; Vasudevan and Sanyal, 2004) .
Self-healing key distribution is a potential candidate to establish session keys for secure communication to large and dynamic groups in highly mobile, volatile and potentially hostile wireless networks, where frequent membership changes may be necessary and the ability to revoke users during certain exchanges is desirable. In such situations the session keys need to be used for a short time-period or need to be updated frequently. Self-healing is a good property for key distribution in wireless mobile and ad hoc networks, where the nodes/devices are powered by batteries and have the unique feature of moving in and out of range frequently. There might be situations where some users are not constantly online or experience burst packet losses. It can rejoin the group once the power is on again. All these factors can take great advantage from self-healing key distribution schemes with revocation capability.
Self-healing key distribution
The main concept of self-healing key distribution schemes is that users, in a large and dynamic group communication over an unreliable network, can recover lost session keys on their own, even if they have lost some previous key distribution messages, without requesting additional transmissions from the group manager. This reduces network traffic and the risk of user exposure through traffic analysis and alleviates the burden on the group manager. The key idea of self-healing key distribution schemes is to broadcast information that is useful information only to trusted members. Combined with users' pre-distributed secrets, this broadcast information enables a trusted member to reconstruct a shared key. However, a revoked member is unable to infer useful information from the broadcast. The only requirement that a user must satisfy to recover the lost keys through self-healing is its membership in the group both before and after the sessions in which the broadcast packet containing the key is sent. A user who has been offline for some period is able to recover the lost session keys immediately after coming back online. Thus the self-healing approach to key distribution is stateless.
Related work
Broadcast encryption is a closely related area which has received much attention from both the network and cryptography community. Efficient key distribution and key management mechanisms are at the core of this. The area of broadcast encryption was formally defined by Fiat and Naor (1994) after the work of Berkovit (1991) and has been extensively studied since then. A number of approaches have been proposed: re-keying schemes for dynamic groups, broadcast schemes with tracing capability, users revocation from a predefined subset of users etc. A few of them are byFurther improvements in efficiency are obtained by relaxing the security slightly -from unconditional to computational (Zhang et al., 2003; Zou and Dai, 2006; Dutta et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 2007; Kausar et al., 2007; Dutta et al., 2009 ). The schemes (Saez, 2004; Saez, 2005; are based on vector space access structure instead of Shamir's (1979) secret sharing. The hash chain based schemes (Dutta et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 2007; Kausar et al., 2007) are computationally secure and are highly efficient compared to the existing unconditionally secure schemes. However, these hash chain based constructions have the fatal defect of not being collusion resistant in the sense that the collusion between newly joined users and the revoked users are able to recover all the session keys which they are not entitled to. Among the collusion resistance self-healing key distribution schemes (e.g. Blundo et al., 2004; Saez, 2004; Saez, 2005; Tian and He, 2008; only by is hash chain based and uses the same selfhealing mechanism as introduced by Dutta et al. (2007) .
Our contribution
Security, efficiency and scalability are three major evaluation measurements for self-healing key distribution schemes. Besides forward secrecy and backward secrecy, collusion resistance property needs to be addressed. Collusion attacks are dangerous to wireless network key distribution schemes as some members of wireless networks may be revoked regularly. From efficiency point of view, reducing communication overhead is a main concern as energy consumed for computation much depends on algorithm and hardware, and is order of magnitude less than that required for communication (Carman et al., 2000) . Also it is required to give consideration to the resource-limited property of nodes while designing protocols for wireless networks. Scalability is another issue as the wireless network may scale up to thousands of nodes and operations are required to finish in a timely manner despite of frequent change of node topology and density.
We address the problem of introducing collusion resistance property to the self-healing key distribution scheme proposed by Dutta et al. (2008) . Collusion attacks would cause serious damages to key distribution schemes as some users of wireless networks may be revoked regularly. We use vector space secret sharing together with one-way hash function. Vector space secret sharing helps to realise general monotone decreasing access structure for the family of subsets of users that can be revoked instead of a threshold one. One way hash chain contributes to reduce communication overheads. In our design, a user is assigned a pre-arranged life cycle by the group manager during user's set-up phase and is revoked once its life cycle finishes.
We achieve the following unique features in our designs as compared to the existing similar schemes: a Our scheme is anti-collusive in the sense that it can resist collusion between the newly joined users and the revoked users, together with forward and backward secrecy.
b Our scheme realises a flexible access structure and achieves scalability.
c Our scheme allows revoked users to rejoin in later sessions with new identities, while this rejoining is prohibited for most of the existing hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes.
d Our scheme is communicationally more efficient than the existing schemes as history of revoked users is not sent as part of the broadcast message. Also storage overhead is less as compared to the previous constructions.
A user may get compromised and need a rapid revocation from the group by the group manager. Thus the group manager has to keep track of compromised users using some traitor tracing algorithm, which might be expensive. In our setting, the group manager pre-selects the session of revocation for a user during user's set-up phase by assigning the user a pre-arranged life cycle. The user is revoked from the system by the group manager once its life cycle is over irrespective of user gets compromised or not. The joining session can be selected by the user. Our designs allow a revoked user to join at a later session with new identity and a new life cycle starting from its new joining session. The group manager believes that a user behaves honestly and will not get compromised during its life cycle. Therefore, there is no need for the group manager to use expensive traitor tracing algorithms in handling compromised nodes. The selection of a user's life cycle is completely determined by the group manager. Assigning each user a pre-arranged life cycle by the group manager and not allowing the user to revoke before its life cycle completes, has natural appeal in many applications. Several innovative business models allow contractual subscription or rental by the service provider for the scalability of business and do not allow the user to get revoked before his contract is terminated. Our scheme is suitable for such applications. Moreover, rejoining of revoked users can be done in our scheme at later sessions with new identities without compromising security, unlike the existing self-healing schemes.
Preliminaries
We begin by explaining key distribution problem and selfhealing property, following it provide definition of one-way function and generalised secret sharing schemes using access structures, and finally we briefly define the security model for self-healing key distribution. The following notations are used throughout the paper (Table 1) .
Key distribution and self-healing
Consider the scenario which has a set-up for pay-per-view TV channel. Suppose 1 { , , } n U U … is a dynamically changing group of users (clients) and
is the group manager (the cable operator). The problem is how the GM can securely communicate with its dynamically changing group of clients over an insecure broadcast channel, so that only authorised clients (who pay) may view the content broadcast by the GM. The GM encrypts the content using a session key. We need a mechanism of distributing this session key in such a way that only the authorised users can recover this session key and decrypt the encrypted content. This mechanism is referred to as the key distribution problem. Our goal is to minimise the overhead for this key distribution keeping the following issues in mind: (a) group re-keying is needed on each membership change; (b) depending on specific nature of applications, we can adopt periodic group re-keying; (c) efficient and secure revocation as well as joining mechanisms are required for dynamic groups etc.
On top of this, U i may get offline for some time due to power failure and may need to recover lost session keys immediately after being online. Self-healing property enables qualified users to recover lost session keys on their own, without requesting additional transmission from the GM. • H can be applied to any size input and produce a fixed length output.
• H is easy to compute.
• H has the one-way property, i.e. Given H(x) it is computationally infeasible to find x.
• H is weak collision resistant, i.e. Given x it is computationally infeasible to find y x ≠ with H(y) = H(x).
• H is strong collision resistant, i.e. it is computationally infeasible to find a distinct pair ( , )
x y with H(x) = H(y).
In what follows A and B are ( ) GF q . As the hash function landscape is constantly changing we do not specify a particular algorithm to compute H, but note that our construction is not dependent on a particular hash function.
Cryptographically Secure Pseudo Random Bit Generators (CSPRBG)
Our system requires a good supply of 'random' numbers. In most practical environments the generation of random numbers is inefficient and the storage and distribution of the resulting random numbers is impractical. In such situations random number generators are replaced by Pseudo Random Number Generators (PRNG). Also without loss of generality we can consider Pseudo Random Bit Generators (PRBG). A PRBG is a deterministic algorithm that inputs a random binary sequence called a seed and outputs a longer binary stream that appears random. The resulting sequence is not random but can be tested in order to gauge predictability. One such test is the next-bit test. A PRBG is said to pass the next-bit test if there is no polynomial time algorithm which, on input of the first l bits of an output sequence s, can predict the (l+1))th bit of s with probability greater than 0.5. A PRBG that passes this test, possibly under a plausible security assumption such as the discrete log problem, is referred to as a Cryptographically Secure Pseudo random bit Generator (CSPRBG).
Secret sharing schemes
In this section we define secret sharing schemes which play an important role in distributed cryptography. 
The above correctness and privacy requirements capture the strict notion of perfect secret sharing, which is the one most commonly referred in the secret sharing literature. Next we define the class of linear secret sharing schemes. There are several equivalent definitions for these schemes (Beimel, 1996) , we provide the following. We are interested in a special case of linear secret sharing scheme, namely vector space secret sharing scheme that will be described shortly.
Definition 4 (Vector Space Access Structure): Suppose Γ is an access structure, and let ( ) We now present vector space secret sharing scheme that was introduced by Brickell (1983) .
• Initialisation:
U . These vectors are public.
• Share Distribution:
3 For 1 i n ≤ ≤ , D gives the share i s to i U .
• Key Recovery: Let B be an authorised subset, B ∈ Γ .
In order to recover the secret K, the participants of B pool their shares and computes
Thus when an authorised subset of participants B ∈ Γ pool their shares, they can determine the value K. On the other hand, one can show that if an unauthorised subset B ∉ Γ pool their shares, they can determine nothing about the value of K (see Brickell, 1983 for proof).
Example 1: Shamir's ( , ) t n -threshold scheme can be seen as a special case of the vector space secret sharing scheme, if > q n , by defining = l t and choosing 
we get the complete multipartite graph 
Example 3: Consider bipartite access structures which are first presented in Padro and Saez (2000) . In such a structure Γ , there is a partition of the set of participants,
, such that all participants in the same class play an equivalent role in the structure. Any subset A ⊂ U is assigned with the point of non-negative integers
and the structure to a region:
To be precise, let n′ be the total number of possible real users.
contains the n′ possible real users and 1 t j − − dummy users, and = { , , 1} Y n t j n t ′ ′ + − + − … contains j dummy users. So the set U contains = 1 n n t ′ + − users. Let us consider the following bipartite access structure
which corresponds to the following region.
x t or x y j and y + + ∈ × ≥ + ≥ + ≥ The maximal non-authorised subsets in this structure are defined by points ( 1, 0) 
t n -threshold structure are defined by 1 t − users. This bipartite access structure Γ cannot be realised by a vector space secret sharing scheme (except in the threshold case = 1 j t − (see Padro and Saez, 2000 for the details), but by a linear one in which each participant is associated with two vectors instead of one. Therefore, each operation will have twice the cost for the same operation in the threshold case.
Vector space secret sharing scheme is a particular case of linear secret sharing scheme, but where every participant can be associated with more than one vector. Any access structure Γ can be realised by a linear secret sharing scheme (Simmons et al., 1991) .
Security model
There are two categories of attacks against the existing selfhealing key distribution schemes: outside attack and inside attack. The attack launched by users who never participated in the communication group is referred to as the outside attack. The outside attacks are prevented by means of some hardware techniques (e.g. tamper resistance) so that the attacker cannot get personal key from a captured/compromised node. On the contrary, the inside attack is launched by users who ever or will be authorised members of a communication group. However, additional security measures should be provided for the group manager to block the intruders from compromising the group manager.
As to the inside attack, we consider an attack scenario where adversary can compromise more than one user. There are three different scenarios to define adversarial goals depending on their degree of severity. In the first scenario, revoked users collude to acquire the subsequent session keys after they are revoked from the authorised group. Another severe attack is when new users collude to acquire the past session keys before they join the communication group. The most severe attack is when the coalition of both revoked users and new joined users try to acquire all the session keys that they were unauthorised to. We now state the following definitions that model the inside attack. These definitions are aimed to computational security for session key distribution adopting the security model of Liu et al. (2003) and Staddon et al. (2002) . Let
be the universe of the network. We assume the availability of a broadcast unreliable channel and there is a group manager GM who sets up and performs join and revoke operations to maintain a communication group, which is a dynamic subset of users of U. Let m be the maximum number of sessions, and 2 ⊂ U R be a monotone decreasing access structure of subsets of users that can be revoked by the group manager GM.
and j G ∈ U be the group established by the group manager GM in session j. In the following definitions, S i denotes the personal secret of user U i , SK j is the session key generated by the GM in session j, B j is the broadcast message by the GM during session j, and Z i,j is the information learned by U i through B j and S i . Definition 5 (Session Key Distribution with Privacy (Staddon et al., 2002) 
Our general construction
We consider a setting in which there is a group manager (GM) and n users
. All our operations take place in a finite field, ( ) GF q , where q is a large prime number ( > q n). In our setting, we allow a revoked user to rejoin the group in a later session. Let : ( ) ( ) GF q GF q → H be a cryptographically secure one-way function. The life of the system is divided in sessions = 1, 2, , j m … . The communication group in session j is denoted by j G ⊂ U . We consider a linear secret sharing scheme realising some access structure Γ over the set U. For simplicity, suppose there exists a public function : Unlike the existing self-healing key distribution schemes, our setting allows a revoked user to rejoin the group in a later session with a new identity. However, we make the following restriction on the life cycle of each user as determined by the GM. Each user i U is first assigned a prearranged life cycle ( , ) 
from the group manager via the secure communication channel between them. Here the operation '.' is the inner product modulo q.
Broadcast: Let j R be the set of all revoked users for sessions in and before j such that j R ∉ Γ and j G be the set of all nonrevoked users in session j. In the j-th session the GM first chooses a subset of users \ 
B is an authorised subset, and one can write 
Self-healing
We now explain our self-healing mechanism in the above constructions: Let i U be a group member that receives session key distribution messages U W R ∈ ∪ , as these identities can be picked from a small finite field. In particular, if our scheme is obtained from Shamir's ( , ) t n -threshold secret sharing scheme that realises access structure defined by
by means of polynomial interpolation, then communication bandwidth for key management is ( 1)log t q + bits.
• Shamir's ( , ) t n -threshold secret sharing scheme, the computation cost for key management is 2 2( ) t t + , which is essentially the number of multiplication operations needed to recover a t-degree polynomial by using Lagrange's interpolation formula.
Security analysis
Theorem 1: Our construction is secure, self-healing session key distribution scheme with privacy, R-revocation capability with respect to Definition 5 in our security model as described in Section 2.5 and achieve R-wise forward and backward secrecy with respect to Definition 6 in the model.
Proof: Our goal is security against coalition of users from R. We will show that our construction is computationally secure with respect to revoked users under the difficulty of inverting one-way function, i.e. for any session j it is computationally infeasible for any set of revoked users from R before and on session j to compute with non-negligible probability the session key … by using a cryptographically secure PRNG and constructs the following backward key chain by repeatedly applying H on y: The condition 1 occurs if either of the following two holds:
• A′ is able to choose ( )
, the probability of which is 1/ q (negligible for large q).
• A′ is able to generate j β ′ from View. Note that from 
has minimal cardinality with 0 j j W R ∪ ∈Γ and will not be able to
if and only if B ∈ Γ . Consequently, A′ will not be able to recover 1 B m j K − + from B j as described above.
• ' A is able to choose ( ) X GF q ∈ so that the following relations hold: The above arguments show that if A′ is successful in breaking the security of our construction, then A is able to invert the one-way function. Hence our construction is computationally secure under the hardness of inverting one-way function and the security of the PRNG. This is forward secrecy. We can also prove the computational security for backward secrecy of our construction using the similar arguments as above considering a coalition of new joined users. The only difference in the proof is that this coalition of new users joined in and after session j knows all the backward keys, but they do not know 1 1 , , j β β − … and consequently are unable to compute the past session keys they were unauthorised to.
We will now show that our construction satisfies all the conditions required by Definition 5. 1 (a) Session key efficiently recovered by a non-revoked user i U is described in the third step of our construction. , the probability of which is 1/ q (negligible for large q).
• A′ is able to generate j β ′ from View. Note that from The above arguments show that if A′ is successful in breaking the security of our construction, then the PRNG used to generate the random numbers by A is insecure. Hence our construction is computationally secure for resisting R-coalition under the assumption that the PRNG is cryptographically secure. We will show that our construction satisfies all the conditions required by Definition 6. 
. Hence it is computationally infeasible for the newly joined member to trace back for previous 1 j β under the security of PRNG for 1 j j ≤ . Consequently, our protocol is R-wise backward secure. In fact, this backward secrecy is independent of R.
Comparison
The storage overhead, communication complexity and computation cost of each user in our construction is provided in Section 5. The existing works to deal with selfhealing key distribution using monotone decreasing family of revoked subset of users instead of monotone decreasing threshold structure are Dutta et al. (2008) and Saez (2004) . In contrast to the family of the self-healing key distribution schemes proposed by Saez (2004) , our general construction uses a different self-healing approach based on Dutta et al. (2008) which is more efficient in terms of computation and communication, yielding a family of more flexible selfhealing key distribution schemes that can provide better properties. Unlike Saez (2004) , the length of the broadcast message in our scheme does not depend on the history of revoked subsets of users to perform self-healing. This feature provides significant reduction in the communication cost, which is one of the main improvement of our scheme over the previous works (Staddon et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2003; Blundo et al., 2004; Hong and Kang, 2005) . For simplicity, we compare a special case of our construction with the other similar schemes considering Shamir's ( , ) t nthreshold secret sharing.
If we consider a secret sharing scheme realising a specific bipartite access structure defined in the set of users, the previous self-healing mechanisms (Staddon et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2003; Blundo et al., 2004; Hong and Kang, 2005) allow to improve the efficiency of revocations of a small number of users, say less than j, for some positive integer 1 j t ≤ − , t is the threshold on the number of revoked users. This is because of the fact that in all the previous selfhealing key distribution schemes, a part of the broadcast message of every session contains a history of revoked subsets of users in order to perform self-healing. This part of broadcast message has a proportional amount of information to 1 t − in all the previous self-healing key distribution schemes, despite only two or three users must be revoked. We overcome this overhead on broadcast message length in our general construction since our selfhealing mechanism does not need to send any such history.
To be more precise, let us use the bipartite access structure Γ in Example 3 of Section 2, which cannot be realised by a vector space secret sharing (except in the threshold case = 1 j t − ), but by a linear one in which each participant is associated with two vectors instead of one. Each operation will have twice the cost of the same operation in the threshold case. In particular, the length of the personal keys is twice the length in the threshold case. This scheme is useful in case the efficiency in the revocation of small subsets has priority. Implementing this using our selfhealing key distribution reduces communication overhead significantly as compared to the previous schemes. ( ) O tj at the j-th session. On the other hand, we achieve less computation cost. For a user i U at the j-th session, the computation cost is incurred by recovering all previous session keys up to the j-th session (worst case) by self-healing mechanism. The communication complexity and computation cost in our constructions do not increase as the number of session grows. These are the most prominent improvement of our schemes over the previous self-healing key distributions (Staddon et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2003; Blundo et al., 2004; Hong and Kang, 2005) . Figures 3 and 4 respectively show the comparative summary of communication and computation costs of our scheme with the existing self-healing key distribution schemes for = 50 j with = 100 m and = 67 q . As mentioned earlier, our construction is also based on Dutta et al. (2008) . However, we have the following subtle differences:
(a) No forward key chain is used in our construction unlike Dutta et al. (2008) .
(b) In contrary to Dutta et al. (2008) , each user i U in our construction is pre-assigned a life cycle ( , ) Remark 5. The group manager decides when a user should get revoked from the system. A user may get malicious any time during a legitimate session. Unless the group manager detects this fact, the user cannot be revoked by the group manager from the system. Thus the group manager has to keep track of compromised users using some special treatment such as traitor tracing, which might be expensive. The risk still remains in the system to have a malicious user until the group manager detects certain misbehaviour of the user. This is a common problem with all the existing selfhealing key distribution schemes. In our pre-arranged lifecycle based approach, there is no need for the group manager to use expensive traitor tracing algorithms in handling compromised nodes. The selection of a user's life cycle is pre-determined by the group manager. The group manager believes that a user behaves honestly and will not get compromised during its life cycle. In our setting, the group manager pre-selects the session of revocation for a user during user's set-up phase by assigning the user a prearranged life cycle. The user is revoked from the system by the group manager once its life cycle is over irrespective of user gets compromised or not. The joining session can be selected by the user. Our designs allow a revoked user to join at a later session with new identity and a new life cycle starting from its new joining session.
Remark 6. Our security model addresses the inside attacks only and the security analysis of our scheme is in this security framework. However, additional security measures should be provided for the group manager to block the intruders from compromising it, thereby preventing the group manager itself to fail under attack. One of the ways to counter such an event is frequent changing of the group manager. Many practical applications of sensor networks require their cluster head roles to be undertaken by different nodes at different time instants (though the aim is mainly to conserve energy). Thus the activities of each such manager node can be voted upon by the remaining members, and the re-assignment of the node to the manager position is contingent on receiving at least a threshold number of votes. Thus, the damage caused to the network can be minimised over long evaluation times, and in the asymptotic case, the malicious group manager will soon be disallowed from resuming the governing activity over the network. It is an open challenge to identify the interval in which member votes can be counted, given the healing time of a proposed method. We shall study this further in future work.
Conclusion
We introduce the collusion resistance property to the generalised self-healing key distribution proposed by Dutta et al. (2008) using a pre-arranged life-cycle based approach. Our set-up allows each user to choose its joining session at its will, but the session for its revocation is pre-selected by the group manager. In contrast to polynomial based schemes, our scheme has realised a general monotone decreasing access structure for the family of subsets that can be revoked instead of a threshold one. This provides more flexible performance for self-healing key distribution and would suit various wireless network environments. Several innovative business models allow contractual subscription or rental by the service provider for the scalability of business and do not allow the user to revoke before its contract is terminated. Our pre-determined life cycle based key distribution scheme is suitable for such applications. The proposed scheme provides better efficiency in communication and storage as compared to the existing approaches. Most important of all, our scheme can resist collusion between the newly joined users and the revoked users besides forward and backward secrecy. The scheme has been properly analysed in an appropriate security model and is proven to be computationally secure. Moreover, rejoining of revoked users can be done in our scheme at later sessions with new identities without compromising security, unlike the existing self-healing schemes.
